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INTRODUCTION 
Private investment fund regulation in the United States and the 
corresponding scholarship evolved as the private investment fund industry 
advanced from a niche market participant in the early 1950s to a major 
industry operating in international financial markets today.  The available 
scholarship traces the main developments in private investment fund 
regulation in three major phases beginning in 1998.  The post 1998 phases 
in regulatory developments of private investment funds are distinguishable 
from the incremental changes in the applicable SEC rulemaking and 
regulatory developments from the 1950s to 1998 because of the heightened 
intensity of regulatory supervision post 1998. 
 In phase one, domestic and international regulatory bodies examined 
ways to improve the existing regulatory framework pertaining to private 
investment funds in the aftermath of the 1998 failure of Long–Term Capital 
Management, L.P. (“LTCM”), the largest hedge fund failure to date.1  Phase 
 
 1.  See WULF A. KAAL, HEDGE FUND REGULATION BY BANKING SUPERVISION: A 
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, 58–72, 133–71 (European Univ. Studies, Ser. V., 
Econ. & Mgmt., Vol. 3174 2006) [hereinafter Kaal, BANKING SUPERVISION] (summarizing the 
legislative and regulatory measures in response to LTCM in the United Kingdom, France, and 
the United States and evaluating the proposals for improvements of the then existing 
regulatory framework for private investment funds through various domestic and international 
regulatory bodies and industry groups). 
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two, starting in 2010 with the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act2 (“Title IV” or 
“Dodd-Frank”), is dominated by the increasing regulatory scrutiny of the 
private investment fund industry under the Dodd-Frank Act and the 
associated rules and Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
guidance.  The SEC continues to refine and expand the regulatory landscape 
for the private fund industry in the aftermath of the Dodd-Frank Act and the 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”),3 and it continues to 
amend rules and SEC reporting forms that apply to the private fund industry.4  
Phase three is characterized by the emerging evidence of the confluence of 
prior separate asset classes5 in the aftermath of the Dodd-Frank Act and other 
long-term implications of the regulatory overhaul under the Dodd-Frank Act, 
such as the dilution of the public/private distinction in federal securities 
regulation. 
This Article traces the main developments in each phase of private 
investment fund regulation from 1998 to 2016 and examines the author’s 
core scholarly contributions and empirical findings pertaining to each phase.  
The author’s scholarly contributions in phase one focused on evaluating the 
proposed remedies6 for private fund investment regulation and suggesting 
alternatives.7  Scholarship in phase two summarized the regulatory evolution 
 
 2.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, §§ 401-416, 124 Stat. 1376, 1570–1580 (2010); id. at § 402 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 80b-2 (2012)) (regulating private investment funds following the financial crisis of 
2008); id. at § 403 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3) (West 2009 & Supp. 2016).  
 3.  Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a)(1), 126 
Stat. 306, 313-14 (2012). 
 4.  See Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry: 
Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2015, 71 BUS. LAW. 1151, 1170-72 (2016) 
(manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2739479 [https://perma.cc/5EZX-VSX9] [hereinafter 
Kaal, Evolution] (outlining notable trends and regulatory developments in the private fund 
industry in the aftermath of Dodd-Frank).  
 5.  See Wulf A. Kaal, Confluence of Private and Mutual Funds, in HANDBOOK ON 
MUTUAL FUNDS 1, 5 (manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2715083 [https://perma.cc/J9G6-
CDVK] [hereinafter Kaal, Confluence] (describing the effects of the proliferation of 
nontraditional asset classes).  
 6.  See Kaal, BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 1. 
 7.  See, e.g., Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation via Basel III, 44 VANDERBILT J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 389 (Apr. 9, 2011) (manuscript) (on file with the Social Science Research 
Network) [hereinafter Kaal, Basel III] (suggesting banking supervision via Basel III to remedy 
hedge funds’ vast exposure to complex derivatives products and associated risks that were 
insufficiently addressed by the then existing regulatory framework); Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge 
Fund Valuation: Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. 
L. 581, 584 (2009) (manuscript), (on file with the Social Science Research Network) 
(exploring the issues created by valuation problems, and suggesting regulatory solutions); 
Kaal, BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 1 (suggesting banking supervision as a promising 
indirect tool to improve lacking regulatory oversight of private funds).  
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of the private fund industry8 and focused particularly on the evaluation of the 
effects of the Dodd-Frank Act on that industry.9  Scholarship in phase two 
also analyzed the shifting evaluation of the possible systemic risk posed by 
the private fund industry10 and pertinent developments in private investment 
fund investor due diligence.11  Scholarship in phase three evaluated the 
implications of the emerging evidence of the confluence of prior separate 
asset classes12 in the aftermath of the Dodd-Frank Act and other long-term 
 
 8.  See Wulf A. Kaal & Dale A. Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the 
United States, in HANDBOOK ON HEDGE FUNDS, (Ohio State Public Law Working Paper No. 
326 & Univ. of St. Thomas (Minn.) Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 16-05, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2714974 [https://perma.cc/2D8P-B9JP] 
(examining the history and evolution of private fund adviser regulation).  
 9.  See generally Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-
Frank Act, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 243, 245 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377 
[https://perma.cc/2QZD-7NQY] [hereinafter Kaal, Registration] (explaining how regulation 
worked to counteract fraud corresponding to increased hedge fund access); Kaal, Evolution, 
supra note 4; Wulf A. Kaal, What Drives Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Costs for Private 
Funds? J. ALTERNATIVE INV., 1, 8 (2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2629386 [https://perma.c
c/HW3T-QS7W] [hereinafter Kaal, Compliance Costs] (evaluating which factors impact 
Dodd-Frank Act compliance costs); Wulf A. Kaal, The Effect of Private Fund Disclosures 
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 9 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 1, 9 (2015) (demonstrating 
that while the overall effect of private disclosures on the industry is moderate, there are still 
improvements to be made), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2447306 [https://perma.cc/HS86-
DCZD] [hereinafter Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures]; Wulf A. Kaal, Barbara Luppi, & Sandra 
Paterlini, Did the Dodd-Frank Act Impact Private Fund Performance? – Evidence from 2010–
2015 (July 10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) http://ssrn.com/abstract=2629347 
[https://perma.cc/TMM8-MWZE] (estimating the impact of private fund adviser registration 
and disclosure requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act on private fund performance); Wulf 
A. Kaal, Hedge Funds’ Systemic Risk Disclosures in Bankruptcy, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 195, 197 (2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2348463 [https://perma.cc/48U7-MBQJ] 
[hereinafter Kaal, Bankruptcy] (analyzing the effect of disclosure requirements on hedge fund 
investors in bankruptcy proceedings).   
 10.   See Kaal, Basel III, supra note 7; Wulf A. Kaal & Timothy A. Krause, Hedge Funds 
and Systemic Risk, in HANDBOOK ON HEDGE FUNDS (manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2
748096 [https://perma.cc/43DK-U2KW] (explaining the shifting literature on hedge funds’ 
systemic risk after Dodd-Frank); Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds After the 
Dodd-Frank Act, 4 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 163, 169-70 (2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008 [https://perma.cc/YE58-UVDW] [hereinafter Kaal, 
Systemic Risk] (asserting that private funds create both a direct and indirect systemic risk); 
Kaal, Bankruptcy, supra note 9, at 199 (outlining SEC systemic risk disclosure requirements 
meant to eliminate risks posed by hedge funds).  
 11.  See Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Investor Due Diligence –Evidence from 1995 to 
2015, REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 1, 6-7, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2811718 [https://perma.cc/NS
T4-AUUE] [hereinafter Kaal, Due Diligence] (describing the increasing rigor of investor due 
diligence in response to the financial crisis of 2008-09 and other associated crises).  
 12.  See Kaal, Confluence, supra note 5; Wulf A. Kaal & Bentley J. Anderson, Uncons
trained Mutual Funds and Retail Investor Protection, REV. BANKING & FIN. L. (manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2811729 [https://perma.cc/TV7N-AZ5T] [hereinafter Kaal & 
Anderson, Protection] (exploring the protection necessary to address issues from the growth 
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implications of the regulatory overhaul under the Dodd-Frank-Act, such as 
the dilution of the public/private distinction in federal securities regulation.13 
This Article has four main parts.  After an introduction to the initial 
structure of private investment fund regulation in Part II that later forms the 
basis for distinguishing the intensity of regulatory change in each of the three 
phases, Part III begins with a discussion of regulatory changes in phase one 
and the implications of LTCM.  Part IV emphasizes the examination of 
regulatory changes in the aftermath of the Dodd-Frank Act, its effects on the 
private investment fund industry, systemic risk implications and changes in 
the assessment of private funds’ systemic risk in the aftermath of the Dodd-
Frank Act, and new findings in the context of private fund investor due 
diligence.  Finally, Part V examines the evidence on the confluence of 
hitherto separate asset classes, especially the evidence pertaining to the 
confluence of private and mutual funds.  Part V also examines the 
implications of confluence of assets classes for the public/private distinction 
in federal securities regulation.  Part VI examines the implications of private 
fund managers’ use of blockchain technology and the associated innovation 
trends in the private investment fund industry.  Part VII concludes. 
I. INITIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN THE UNITED STATES 
Private investment funds in the United States began operations as 
privately held and privately managed investment funds that were 
unregistered and exempt from federal securities regulation.14 
A. Reliance on Exemptions 
In the early 1950s, organizers of private investment funds designed the 
funds to be exempt from the registration requirements of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (private investment funds are not mutual funds), the 
registration requirements of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (private 
fund advisers are not classified as public investment advisers), the public 
offering registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 (“33 Act”) 
(no public offering is required), and the periodic reporting requirements of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“34 Act”) (private investment funds 
 
of the hedge fund industry relative to alternative asset classes).   
 13.  See generally Kaal, Confluence, supra note 5; Kaal & Anderson, Protection, supra 
note 12. 
 14.  Kaal & Oesterle, supra note 8, at 1–2 (“The originators of the early funds designed 
the funds to maximize their freedom to employ complex trading strategies by minimizing their 
exposure to regulation under various federal statutes.  Characteristics of early hedge funds 
included their ability to remain unregistered and exempt from federal securities regulation.”).  
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are not publicly traded companies).15  Private investment funds also avoid 
classification as financial market intermediaries that are specifically 
regulated by federal legislation, including underwriters, market makers, 
broker-dealers, banks, or investment subsidiaries of operating companies.  
By having fewer than 500 investors, private investment funds also generally 
avoid the periodic reporting obligations of section 12 of the Exchange Act 
and SEC Rule 12g-1. 
Private investment funds traditionally also relied on the “private 
offerings” exemption under the 33 Act and the “safe harbor” provision in 
Rule 506 of Regulation D.  Reliance on these exemptions allows private 
investment funds to market themselves only to accredited investors, who are 
institutional investors, insiders, or natural persons with a net worth of over 
$1 million or income of over $200,000 for each of the last two years.16  
Private investment funds using Rule 506 could not use any form of general 
solicitation or general advertising.  The SEC applied a pre-existing, 
substantive relationship test when deciding that the general solicitation rule 
had not been violated.  The traditional restrictions in Rule 506 have been 
relaxed under the JOBS Act. 
The Investment Company Act of 1940 contains the most important 
regulatory exemption for private investment funds.  Private investment funds 
rely on one of two statutory exclusions in the definition of an investment 
company.  Either they have fewer than 100 investors or their investors are 
qualified purchasers.17  A hedge fund that qualifies for one of these statutory 
exclusions may use investment techniques, such as shorting, among others, 
that are prohibited for registered investment companies. 
Through the structuring of their operations, private investment funds 
can also avoid additional otherwise applicable regulations.  Private 
investment funds avoid regulation under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (“ERISA”) by limiting the ownership interest of any employee 
benefit plan to less than 25% of the fund.  Private investment funds also 
typically avoid the regulation of “commodity pools” by the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”).  New CFTC rules exempt pools that 
sell only to sophisticated participants, “accredited investors” under 
Regulation D, or “qualified purchasers” under the Investment Company Act. 
Despite the broad application of exemptions and avoidance of certain 
rules by way of structuring operations, private investment funds are still 
subject to the general legal framework applicable to financial institutions.  
Such regulations include the antifraud provisions of the 33 and 34 Acts, state 
 
 15.  Id. at 7. 
 16.  Id. at 5.  
 17.  “Qualified purchasers” refers to individuals who own more than $5 million in 
investments or companies with more than $25 million in investments.  Id. at 6.   
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law prohibitions against investor fraud, insider trading prohibition under 
Rule 10b-5, and applicable banking laws restricting the activities of private 
investment fund lenders.18 
B. Evolution of the Investment Advisers Act Exemption 
The controversial nature and evolution of the registration exemptions 
and safe harbor under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 underscore their 
policy relevance.  The registration exemptions and safe harbor under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and the applicable SEC guidance have 
traditionally allowed advisers to private investment funds to avoid 
registration as investment advisers with the SEC.19  Until the passing of the 
Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, the safe harbor allowed investment advisers to 
private investment funds to manage large amounts of securities indirectly for 
several hundreds of investors in several funds.20  Under the safe harbor, 
investment advisers to private investment funds were able to count a legal 
organization as a single client, provided the investment advice was based on 
the objectives of the legal organization, rather than the individual investment 
objectives of any owners of the legal organization. 
The controversy over private fund adviser registration requirements 
started in 1969.  Because of private investment funds’ alleged involvement 
and impact on the 1969 bear market, the SEC started to consider 
opportunities to increase the regulatory scrutiny of the industry.  While the 
SEC initially opined that hedge funds were “dealers” in securities, which 
could require registration under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,21 
its guidance in the form of no-action letters continued to support the private 
fund industry in determining how to count clients to stay exempt from 
securities regulation until 1985. 
Finally, in 1985, in an attempt to clarify the no-action letter guidance 
and provide private investment fund advisers with greater certainty in 
determining when they might rely on the safe harbor, the SEC adopted the 
investment adviser registration safe harbor in Rule 203(b)(3) under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.22  The safe harbor allowed a limited 
partnership, rather than each of its limited partners, to be counted as a 
“client” of a general partner acting as investment adviser to the partnership.  
 
 18.  See id. at 7 (pointing out the SEC’s interest in bringing hedge funds under its 
regulatory authority).   
 19.  Kaal, Basel III, supra note 7, at 412–14.  
 20.  Id. at 414; Kaal, Registration, supra note 9, at 256-57; Kaal & Oesterle, supra note 
8 at 7–8.   
 21.  Kaal & Oesterle, supra note 8 at 7. 
 22.  Kaal, Basel III, supra note 77, at 412–14; Kaal, Registration, supra note 9, at 256-
57; Kaal & Oesterle, supra note 8 at 7–9. 
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The SEC reasoned that if an investment adviser manages an investment pool 
on the basis of the investment objectives of its participants, the entire pool 
should be viewed as the adviser’s client, rather than each participant.23 
In December 2004, in an unprecedented politically-motivated reversal 
of existing safe harbor rulemaking, the SEC, using its rulemaking authority 
under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, issued a final rule that required 
the overwhelming majority of previously unregistered private investment 
fund advisers to register with the SEC, giving it enhanced oversight over the 
industry.24  Hedge fund advisers strongly opposed this controversial rule.25  
Without the private adviser exemption and as newly registered advisers, 
private investment fund advisers were subject to SEC inspections and 
bookkeeping and record keeping requirements.  Private investment funds 
were now faced with disclosure requirements and code of ethics 
requirements resulting in substantially higher legal fees.  Registration also 
allowed the SEC to screen private investment fund advisers for prior 
convictions or other professional misconduct. 
The registration requirement precipitated substantial opposition by the 
hedge fund industry.  Eventually, in July 2006, the D.C. Circuit in Goldstein 
v. SEC vacated the hedge fund rule as an instance of arbitrary rulemaking by 
the SEC.26  Because the term “client” had not otherwise been defined in the 
Investment Advisers Act, the SEC had no authority to determine the meaning 
of the term.  Most hedge fund advisers who had registered under the 
registration rule deregistered.27  After the Goldstein decision, the SEC 
proposed additional accredited investor standards under Regulation D and 
dramatically expanded antifraud protection for investors. 
 
 23.  Kaal & Oesterle, supra note 8 at 8 (“The SEC broadened the scope of the rule in 
1997 by including other entities used by investment advisers to pool client assets.  Although 
the 1985 Rule permitted advisers to count each partnership, trust, or corporation as a single 
client, the 1997 Rule expanded the rule to cover other legal entities.  Specifically, investment 
advisers could count a legal organization as a single client provided the investment advice 
was based on the objectives of the legal organization rather than the individual investment 
objectives of any owners of the legal organization.  This safe harbor allowed investment 
advisers to manage large amounts of securities indirectly for several hundreds of investors in 
several hedge funds.”). 
 24.  See id. at 9 (providing that the SEC’s rule was motivated to increase information on 
hedge fund advisers, deter fraud, and improve compliance due to the growth of the hedge fund 
industry, increased hedge fund risk, and financial loss to investors from fraudulent activity by 
advisers).   
 25.  See Kaal, Registration, supra note 9, at 244–45, 249, 258–61 (stating that 91 of the 
124 letters submitted to the SEC regarding the rule were against the proposal); Kaal & 
Oesterle, supra note 8 at 8–9 (explaining that advisers were subject to SEC inspections and 
bookkeeping requirements without the private adviser exception).  
 26.  Kaal, Evolution, supra note 4, at 1156; Kaal, Basel III, supra note 7, at 414–16; Kaal, 
Registration, supra note 9, at 247, 260-61; Kaal & Oesterle, supra note 8 at 9.  
 27.  Kaal, Basel III, supra note 7, at 416, 428–29; Kaal, Evolution, supra note 4, at 1157.  
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II. FAILURE OF LONG-TERM-CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 
The failure of LTCM was the most publicized case of a failure of a 
private investment fund and the significance of a failure for the stability of 
world financial markets.28  Right after the announcement of the Russian debt 
moratorium in mid-August 1998, LTCM suffered losses of $1.8 billion, 
bringing its loss of equity for the year to over 50%.29  Because banks and 
brokers had allowed LTCM to borrow 100% of the value of its collateral 
prior to the worsening of LTCM’s financial condition in 1998, LTCM’s $4.8 
billion in capital dissipated quickly when the banks began to make margin 
calls.  In order to stay afloat, LTCM required a large capital injection.  
However, because of the size of its debts, LTCM’s creditors would likely 
have been pushed into insolvency if LTCM had been allowed to file for 
bankruptcy.  The already unstable world credit markets in 1998 would likely 
have collapsed if LTCM’s creditors had liquidated their LTCM collateral to 
the value of $1 trillion to recoup their costs.30  Realizing the effect of 
allowing LTCM to file for bankruptcy on other market participants, the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York orchestrated a bailout of LTCM with 
fourteen leading investment banks committing between $100 million to $350 
million each.31 
LTCM’s failure and its effect on world financial markets raised 
regulators’ awareness of the risks pertaining to private investment funds32 
and the risk tolerance of banks, prime brokers, and other counterparties to 
private investment funds.33  Because private investment funds take risks that 
other financial participants and other counterparties to banks would not, 
borrow massive amounts, and are willing to pay a premium for borrowing, 
banks’ managements generally view private investment fund banking 
relationships as desirable.  However, banks overexposed themselves to 
private investment fund lending, allowing LTCM and other private 
investment funds to grow significantly.  As counterparties to private 
investment funds, such as LTCM, banks put their own existence at risk with 
 
 28.  Kaal, BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 1, at 52. 
 29.  While LTCM at the time of its collapse had around 80% of its assets under 
management (AUM) in government bonds of G7 countries, it also traded on and off-exchange 
derivatives in interest rates, equity products, and foreign exchange, controlling $160 billion 
in stocks and bonds, $4.8 billion in capital, and derivatives with a notional value of $1 trillion. 
Id. at 53–54. 
 30.  Id. at 56–57. 
 31.  Id. at 57.  The consortium injected $3.6 billion in private equity into LTCM and 
received a 90% stake in LTCM´s portfolio and operational control in return. 
 32.  The LTCM failure illustrated the dangerous combination of high leverage, large 
positions, funding illiquidity, inadequate risk management, investor redemptions, and 
insufficient monitoring of fund credit quality by counterparties. Id. at 57. 
 33.  Id. at 58–72,133-71.  
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their lending practices. 
A. Critique of Regulatory Proposals 
Scholarly engagement with the topic of private investment fund 
regulation increased markedly in the aftermath of the failure of LTCM in 
1998.34  Whereas prior to the LTCM debacle the literature had mostly 
evaluated the model approaches to private investment fund regulation, 
including coordinated international cooperation, national direct regulation, 
indirect regulation, and prudential regulation,35 post LTCM all leading 
international and domestic regulatory bodies reviewed regulatory 
approaches in an attempt to improve the regulatory framework for private 
investment funds.36 
International and domestic regulatory bodies proposed reform of the 
regulatory framework for private investment in an attempt to address the 
perceived regulatory shortcomings identified by the failure of LTCM.  Most 
of the proposals for regulatory improvements involved some of the following 
elements: financial intermediaries’ risk management; risk management of 
private investment funds; improvements for the role of regulators in 
individual financial intermediaries with significant private investment fund 
business, especially firms’ risk management; improvements in market 
practices at the industry and firm levels, and improvements in transparency, 
e.g., reporting and disclosure recommendations.37 
Starting in 2005, this author critiqued the proposals to remedy the 
regulatory framework for private investment funds post-LTCM.38  He found 
that proposals involving clearer credit risk strategies and credit risk 
management policies and processes for financial intermediaries were 
inappropriately applied across the range of business models and lacked 
concrete implementation elements.  Proposals calling for credit departments 
for financial intermediaries proved very costly.  Increased stress tests, Value 
at Risk, and Monte Carlo scenarios for financial intermediaries to private 
 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 48-51. 
 36.  Id. at 133-71 (summarizing and evaluating regulatory proposals issued by the Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision, the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve System, the U.S. 
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, the Counterparty Risk Management Policy 
Group, the Multidisciplinary Working Group on Enhanced Disclosure, the Hedge Fund 
Industry Group, the Committee on the Global Financial  System, the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association, and the Financial Stability Forum Working Group on Highly 
Leveraged Institutions).   
 37.  Id. at 171.  
 38.  Id. at 171-74; Kaal, Basel III, supra note 7, at 408–10, 424–34, 436–39, 444–48, 
456–62. 
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investments funds necessarily use historical data and are less valuable as an 
indicator of high risk sensitivity for future events.39  Proposals for increased 
risk management in private investment funds may not adequately take into 
account evidence on private investment funds’ performance in relative 
secrecy.40  Calls for improving the role of regulators in individual financial 
intermediaries with significant private investment fund business encounter 
significant transaction costs.  Proposals calling for improvements in close-
out netting agreements for financial contracts and calls for harmonized 
standard documentation across jurisdictions may encounter jurisdictional 
arbitrage and national protectionism.41 
B. Indirect Regulation 
A core emphasis in this author’s scholarly focus post LTCM involved 
banks’ lending exposure to private investment funds as an indirect means of 
supervising the private investment fund industry.42  Banks are ideally 
positioned to support private investment fund regulation.43  Several factors, 
including the exclusivity, intensity, length, and quality of the relationship 
between banks and private investment funds influence the level of control a 
bank may exercise over a private investment fund.44  Some private 
investment fund managers may terminate a lending relationship to avoid a 
bank’s attempts to exercise control over a private investment fund.  
However, because private investment funds’ dynamic trading strategies 
often depend on the immediate availability of capital; and given today’s 
banking environment with increased scrutiny over lending and lending 
relationships, managers are unlikely to terminate a lending relationship.45 
In a 2009–10 scholarly exchange between this author and Professor 
Roberta Romano,46 Professor Romano pointed out that: “[private investment 
 
 39.  Kaal, BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 1, at 171-74. 
 40.  Id. at 171–74.  
 41.  Id. at 171-74. 
 42.  Kaal, Basel III, supra note 7; Kaal, BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 1. 
 43.  Kaal, BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 1.  
 44.  Id. at 217-218. 
 45.  Id.  
 46.  See Wulf A. Kaal & Christian Kirchner, Economics of Financial Market Regulation: 
Financial Reporting Standards, Banking Regulation, and Hedge Funds, in LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 5 (Peter Nobel, Katrin Krehan & Anne-
Cathrine Tanner eds., 2010) (discussing the importance of economic regulations on the banks 
as the major players in investment); Roberta Romano, Against Financial Regulation 
Harmonization: A Comment (Yale L. & Econ. Res. Paper No. 414, 2010),  https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1697348 [https://perma.cc/ZQ9J-LTYG] (arguing that the 
move to regulate hedge funds more is misguided and that hedge funds were not the cause of 
the recent financial crisis); Kaal, Basel III, supra note 7. 
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funds] manage only a small proportion of the investment universe, 
particularly as compared to banks’ assets and are far less leveraged than 
banks.”47  European and United States legislators’ attempts at imposing 
stricter rules on private investment funds, seizing on hedge funds’ alleged 
impact on market stability in the 2008–09 credit crisis could, therefore, have 
been misplaced. 
In response, and in an attempt to show the relevance of indirect 
regulation of private investment funds via increased regulatory emphasis on 
banks’ lending exposure to private investment funds, this author referenced 
data on hedge funds’ growing participation in managing complex financial 
instruments, such as CDOs and other derivatives.48  The data suggest that 
since 2000 private investment funds have steadily increased their share in 
the credit derivatives market while banks’ role in the market for credit 
derivatives has declined.49  The increasing role of private investment funds 
in the credit derivatives market50 in combination with the failure of that 
market in 2009 formed the basis for this author’s proposal to increase the 
regulatory emphasis on banks’ lending exposure to private investment 
funds.51 
Another indirect form of private investment fund regulation, proposed 
by this author, focuses on investor suitability criteria.52  After evaluating the 
shortcomings of the then existing numerical wealth requirements defining 
qualified investors who were then eligible for investments in private 
investment funds,53 this author suggested in 2009, e.g., before the regulatory 
overhaul of private investment fund regulation in Title IV of the Dodd-Frank 
Act in 2010, that investor suitability standards could help address concerns 
over the shortcomings of investor eligibility standards.  Such proposed 
investor suitability standards would require independent verification of 
investors’ ability to evaluate highly complex financial products and 
investment risk, rendering wealth as a proxy for sophistication redundant for 
investor eligibility.54 
 
 47.  Kaal, Basel III, supra note 7, at 454. 
 48.  Id. at 454–55. 
 49.  Id. at 455 (Table 1). 
 50.  Id. at 455 (Table 1).  
 51.  Id. at 448-62 
 52.  Kaal, Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability, supra note 7.  
 53.  Id. at 636–37 (“The numerical wealth requirements that are currently in place to 
define qualified investors . . .  do not take into account that even investors who would 
otherwise fulfil the numerical wealth requirements do not always have the adequate level of 
knowledge, understanding and sophistication that would be required for investing in highly 
complex financial instruments.  Recent proposals by the SEC to toughen the numeracy wealth 
requirements for hedge fund investing fail to ascertain the appropriate level of sophistication 
and adequate understanding of highly complex financial instruments.”).  
 54.  Id. at 637.  
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III. DODD-FRANK-ACT 
In an unprecedented overhaul of the regulatory environment for private 
investment funds advisers in the United States, the Dodd-Frank Act in effect 
overruled all previous SEC rules and legal precedent on private investment 
fund adviser registration exemptions.55  Dodd-Frank added a significant new 
chapter in the debate on private investment fund adviser registration.56 
Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act is entitled the Private Fund Investment 
Advisers Registration Act of 2010 (“PFIARA”).  PFIARA authorizes the 
SEC to bring private investment funds under regulatory supervision.57  
PFIARA mandates private investment fund adviser registration to increase 
record keeping and disclosure.  Under PFIARA, private investment fund 
advisers with more than $150 million assets under management (“AUM”) 
must register as investment advisers and disclose information about their 
trades and portfolios to the SEC.58  The Dodd-Frank Act also directs the SEC 
to set up rules for the registration and reporting of private investment fund 
managers who were previously exempt from registration.59 
As part of the new rules, the SEC introduced controversial reporting 
obligations in a form called Form PF (private funds).60  Form PF requires 
investment managers to disclose information about themselves, the funds 
they manage, and their investors.61  The unprecedented disclosures in Form 
 
 55.  See supra notes Error! Bookmark not defined.–Error! Bookmark not defined. 
and accompanying text.  
 56.  Kaal, Basel III, supra note 7, at 410–36; Kaal, Registration, supra note 9, at 261-73; 
Kaal & Oesterle, supra note 8 at 9–15; Kaal, Evolution, supra note 4, at 1158-59.  
 57.  Kaal, Evolution, supra note 4, at 1157–58. 
 58.  Id. at 1158–65.  By registering private investment fund advisers, the SEC intends to 
collect necessary information to curtail those who operate in the “shadows of our markets,” 
prevent fraud, limit systemic risk, and provide information to investors. 
 59.  Id. at 1157–58; Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration, supra note 9, at 249, 262. 
 60.  Kaal, Evolution, supra note 4, at 1159, 1163–65; Kaal, Registration, supra note 9, at 
269–73. 
 61.  U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, FORM PF: REPORTING FORM FOR INVESTMENT ADVISERS 
TO PRIVATE FUNDS AND CERTAIN COMMODITY POOL OPERATORS AND COMMODITY TRADING 
ADVISORS, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formpf.pdf [https://perma.cc/NTV8-
V4RC].  Form PF disclosure requirements include a breakdown of the net asset value (NAV) 
that the investment manager manages, including the percentage of the reporting fund’s NAV 
that was managed using high-frequency trading strategies.  Form PF requires investment 
advisers to disclose the five trading counterparties to which the reporting fund has the greatest 
net counterparty credit exposure and the dollar amount owed to each creditor.  It also requires 
that the manager identify changes in market factors and their effect on the portfolio’s long 
and short components as a percentage of NAV.  Additional disclosures include any 
information about the counterparties’ collateral and other credit support posted to the 
respective reporting funds, as well as trading and clearing mechanisms subject to liquidity 
constraints and the duration of those constraints.  Form PF is also intended to improve the 
SEC’s understanding of reporting funds’ liquidity, exposure, and assets.  Accordingly, Form 
KAAL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/2018  3:22 PM 
592 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 20.3 
 
PF that made it so controversial in the industry include the disclosure of 
strategies and products used by the private investment fund adviser and its 
funds, performance and changes in performance, financing information, risk 
metrics, counterparties and credit exposure, positions held by the investment 
adviser, percent of assets traded using algorithms, and the percent of equity 
and debt, among other matters.62 
In light of the highly sensitive and controversial nature of these required 
disclosures and the complexity of the reporting requirements, Form PF 
created substantial challenges for the hedge fund industry.  Arguing that the 
mandatory private investment fund disclosure requirements in Form PF 
could inappropriately burden the private investment fund industry, private 
investment fund advisers have traditionally opposed enhanced transparency 
of the funds they manage.63  While the disclosures in Form PF were private, 
i.e., only the SEC and not the public had access, the industry feared that such 
information could at some point in the future be made public, which would 
largely eliminate private investment fund managers’ ability to make absolute 
returns for their clients, as competitors would be able to reverse engineer 
their strategies.  Apart from concerns about publicity, the private investment 
fund industry complained that many reporting provisions on Form PF used 
industry terms inconsistently and many required disclosures were rather hard 
to produce.64  For instance, the disclosure of counterparty credit exposure is 
sensitive information that often cannot readily be determined by the 
individual private investment fund managers. 
In a concerted effort to enforce the Dodd-Frank Act provisions 
pertaining to the private investment fund industry, the SEC increased 
examinations and enforcement actions against private investment fund 
 
PF requires investment advisers to disclose the time increments needed to liquidate a certain 
percentage of the reporting fund’s portfolio, the dollar value of long and short positions in 
each asset class, the value of turnover by asset class, the types of creditors and the market 
value of borrowings from them, and the aggregate value of all derivative positions for each 
advised fund.  Finally, Form PF requires disclosure of the reporting fund’s restrictions (if any) 
on investor withdrawals and redemptions and other information pertaining to investor 
liquidity, such as the percentage of NAV. 
 62.  Id.  Private investment fund advisers are also required to provide confidential reports 
with respect to certain information related to systemic risk, such as trading practices; trading 
and investment positions; the amount of AUM; valuation policies; side letters; the use of 
leverage, including off-balance sheet leverage; counterparty credit risk exposures; and other 
information deemed necessary. 
 63.  See Kaal & Oesterle, supra note 8 at 11-12 (surveying duties and costs absorbed by 
investment and hedge fund advisers as a result of Form PF); Kaal, Evolution, supra note 4, at 
1164 (discussing the sensitive and complex requirements that Form PF imposes on the hedge 
fund industry). 
 64.  See Kaal, Evolution, supra note 4, at 1165 (discussing 2012 survey results reflecting 
the challenges that hedge fund advisers faced as a result of Form PF, and noting that advisors 
found reporting requirements ambiguous).   
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advisers.65  In its enforcement efforts in the aftermath of the enactment of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC emphasized the equitable allocation of expenses 
among investment advisers’ portfolio funds, the allocation of investment 
opportunities among private investment fund advisers’ clients, and fund 
advisers’ personal investing and outside business activities.66 
These enforcement trends foreshadow further intensifying regulatory 
enhancements pertaining to the private investment fund industry.  In light of 
SEC guidance in public statements, it is reasonable for the private investment 
fund industry to expect longer and more intrusive SEC examinations, further 
enhanced regulations, and increased SEC enforcement actions against 
private investment fund managers.67  The Department of the Treasury’s 
proposed rule targeting investment advisers’ filing and reporting 
requirements about money laundering, Form ADV disclosures, and the 
definition of “accredited investor,” among other non-final rules in 2015, 
provide a taste of possible future developments for the industry.68 
A. Implications of Title IV—Empirical Evidence 
Given the highly controversial nature of Title IV and the private 
investment fund industry’s claims pertaining to its detrimental effect on the 
industry, this author examined the impact of Title IV in several empirical 
studies.69 
1. Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act 
In the first survey study70 conducted right before the registration 
effective date under Title IV, March 30, 2012, this author and a team of four 
research assistants contacted a population of 1,267 private fund advisers who 
 
 65.  Id. at 1173-76.  
 66.  Id.  For example, significant enforcement actions against private funds from 2012 to 
2015 include undisclosed conflicts of interest, actions for misallocation of expenses, and 
inflating the values of certain illiquid assets that hedge funds and private funds hold.  SEC 
enforcement actions included enforcement of Rule 206(4)-7, which requires funds to adopt, 
implement, and annually review compliance policies.  Moreover, the SEC settled charges with 
private investment managers who received accelerated portfolio company monitoring fees 
from sales and initial public offerings (IPOs) of portfolio companies and who failed to disclose 
conflicts arising from the manager’s conversion of portfolio company monitoring fees that 
could have partially been offset.   
 67.  Id. at 1176. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Kaal, Evolution, supra note 4; Wulf A. Kaal, The Private Fund Industry Five Years 
After the Dodd-Frank Act – A Survey Study, 35 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 624 (2016) 
[hereinafter Private Fund Industry]; Kaal, Registration, supra note 9. 
 70.  Kaal, Registration, supra note 9, at 249.  
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registered with the SEC before the registration effective date.  The author 
contacted the entire population via fax, an electronic survey via email, and 
phone interviews.  Respondents (n=94) answered questions designed to 
evaluate the long-term effects of reporting and disclosure rules on private 
funds and the private fund industry.71  The survey questions assessed 
strategic responses of the hedge fund industry to Title IV, investigated the 
possible long-term effects of hedge fund registration, quantified compliance 
costs, assessed compliance measures, investigated the implications of 
disclosure requirements in the Dodd-Frank Act pertaining to hedge funds, 
evaluated the effect of the regulatory regime on AUM, and assessed the 
effect of the regulatory regime on profitability. 
The results reported in this study suggested that the Dodd-Frank Act 
registration and disclosure requirements and the SEC’s implementation of 
these requirements created several areas of concern for the hedge fund 
industry.72  Despite these concerns, the hedge fund industry appeared to be 
only moderately affected and seems to be adapting well to the regulatory 
environment after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act.73 
More specifically, this first survey study shows that 46.34% of those 
who responded indicated that the Dodd-Frank registration and disclosure 
rules created higher costs that affected the funds they managed, while 
78.26% of respondents stated that the profits of their investment 
management company were affected.74  According to 87.50% of the 
respondents, the profits of their investment companies were affected by 
increased costs as a result of the registration and reporting requirements.  A 
majority of respondents engaged in the following activities:  (1) outsourced 
compliance work, (2) hired additional counsel, (3) instituted new record-
keeping policies, (3) hired additional staff, (4) changed marketing materials, 
and (5) changed communications with investors.  A minority of respondents 
changed their funds’ legal structures in response to the registration and 
disclosure requirements. 
Despite the concerns identified in the first study, the hedge fund 
industry appeared at the time of the study to be only moderately affected by 
the Dodd-Frank reporting and disclosure requirements and adapted well to 
the then new regulatory environment.75  The results demonstrated that 
82.02% of respondents at the time did not take the current regulatory regime 
into account in determining the AUM size of their funds, and 72.09% of 
survey respondents did not plan a strategic response to the Dodd-Frank Act 
 
 71.  Id. at 275.  
 72.  Id. at 315. 
 73.  Id. at 315-16. 
 74.  Id. at 315. 
 75.  Id. at 315–16. 
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registration and reporting requirements.76  Firms that planned a strategic 
response were smaller than those firms that did not plan a strategic response.  
Of those who responded, 76.09% stated that their investors’ rate of return 
was not affected by the registration and disclosure requirements.77 
A majority of advisers in the first survey study quantified the cost of 
compliance in a range from $50,000 to $200,000.78  However, a significant 
minority estimated that the total compliance cost would range between 
$200,000 to over $400,000.79  Although a majority of advisers spent fewer 
than 500 hours to comply with the new registration and reporting 
requirements, many fund advisers estimated it will take them between 500 
and 1000 hours to comply with the requirements.  The hours needed to 
comply with all federal rules and regulations pertaining to hedge fund 
advisers range from under 100 up to 4000 hours, with a majority of responses 
ranging from over 300 hours to 800 hours.80 
A majority of respondents did not feel the need to change the size of 
their AUM, and Dodd-Frank Act regulations were not factors a majority of 
respondents considered if they did change the AUM size of their funds.  For 
80.46% of respondents, the Form PF threshold for quarterly reporting of $1.5 
billion AUM was not taken into account in determining the appropriate size 
of AUM for the funds they manage.81  A majority of the 19.54% of 
respondents who would take the Form PF threshold into account plan to stay 
under the Form PF threshold for quarterly reporting of $1.5 billion AUM.82 
Anecdotal evidence collected during the course of the survey study 
suggested that the information disclosed by hedge fund advisers in required 
Forms ADV and PF could then be presented by advisers and third party 
service providers in ways that in effect “flatten out” and “sanitize” the 
disclosures.83  Although the level of sanitizing of disclosures could not be 
verified, sanitized disclosures could be less useful for Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (FSOC) and SEC evaluation and their determination of 
the systemic risk posed by private funds.84 
To summarize, the results of the first survey study in 2013 suggested 
that the private fund industry had been adjusting well to the registration and 
disclosure requirements for private fund advisers introduced in Title IV in 
 
 76.  Id. at 315–16. 
 77.  Id. at 316. 
 78.  Id.  
 79.  Id.  
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Id.  
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Id.  
 84.  Id.  
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2012.85  The impact of the registration and disclosure rules appeared to be 
much less intense than the industry initially anticipated.  Although hedge 
fund advisers seemed to absorb the reported cost implications of registration 
and disclosure rules relatively quickly after registration, the long-term cost 
implications of registration and reporting obligations still had the potential 
to affect the private fund industry in the long run. 
Because the data for the first study had been collected within three 
months after the registration requirements in Title IV took effect, the author 
knew that future survey studies would be needed to determine the long-term 
impact of the Dodd-Frank Act.86 
2. Private Fund Industry Five Years After the Dodd-Frank Act 
In a second study, this author evaluated the long-term implications of 
the unprecedented yet evolving post Dodd-Frank Act regulatory framework 
pertaining to the private fund industry.87  The study helps clarify the relevant 
long-term implications of the fundamental reshaping of the regulatory 
landscape for the private fund industry through both the Dodd-Frank Act and 
the JOBS Act.  For the second study, this author and a team of research 
assistants collected and coded data for a population of 1,267 registered 
investment advisers.  Respondents (N=69) answered questions in several 
categories designed to identify cost, compliance, and management issues 
associated with the post Dodd-Frank Act regulatory framework.88 
The evidence provided in this study supports findings from the author’s 
earlier study
 
suggesting that the industry adapted well to the new regulatory 
environment in the aftermath of the Dodd-Frank Act.  The findings in this 
study suggested that the industry is mostly affected by the uncertainty and 
higher costs associated with the Act, but under multiple metrics the industry 
appeared to be coping well overall with the evolving post Dodd-Frank Act 
regulatory landscape.89 
Nevertheless, the findings of this study also show that the Dodd-Frank 
Act had negative long-term effects on the private fund industry.  More than 
a third of respondents (34.9%) opined that Title IV will affect the private 
fund industry in the next five years because of additional expenses, and 
nearly a third (32.6%) opined that it will create barriers to entry to private 
fund market entrants.  Fifty percent of respondents indicated that the Dodd-
Frank registration and disclosure rules have created higher costs that will 
 
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Id. at 316-17. 
 87.  Kaal, Private Fund Industry, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 624. 
 88.  Id.  
 89.  Id. at 624, 626-27, 631.  
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affect their funds in the next five years.  The majority of those respondents 
who believed that Dodd-Frank has affected their fund(s) earnings blamed 
additional compliance costs associated with Dodd-Frank.  A majority of 
respondents have instituted measures in response to the requirements 
imposed by Title IV.  The most common actions taken included:  (1) 
outsourcing compliance work, (2) hiring additional counsel, (3) instituting 
new record-keeping policies, (4) hiring additional staff, (5) changing 
marketing materials, and (6) changing communications with investors.  
Moreover, a majority of respondents stated that as a result of the post Dodd-
Frank Act regulatory regime, their AUM would need to change.  While 
18.2% of respondents would lower their AUM to avoid the regulatory hassle, 
27.3% actually still want to increase their AUM.90  Another 27.3% desire to 
attain the right size to cover expenses. 
Compliance costs were a significant issue for the private fund industry, 
and the survey helps clarify compliance cost issues associated with Title IV.  
A majority of respondents found Dodd-Frank compliance costs to range from 
$50,000 to $200,000.  However, a significant minority estimated that the 
total compliance costs will range from $200,000 to over $400,000.91  A 
considerable number of respondents estimated the total annual cost to 
comply with all federal regulations pertaining to the private fund industry at 
up to $100,000.  The largest number of respondents (26.5%), however, 
estimated the annual compliance cost for all federal regulations at between 
$100,000 and $200,000.92  A smaller group (14.3%) estimated the cost of 
compliance as more than $400,000 a year. 
Respondents’ estimates pertaining to compliance time are consistent 
with their estimates pertaining to compliance cost.  Although a clear majority 
of adviser respondents spent fewer than 500 hours to comply with Title IV, 
a noticeable minority (11.5%) estimated compliance time at more than 1000 
hours.  Sixty-five and one-tenth percent of respondents estimated the total 
time required to comply with all federal regulations at between 100 and 500 
hours.  However, a significant minority (20.9%) estimated it above 1000 
hours. 
The results in several survey question categories suggest that Title IV 
of the Dodd-Frank Act had a negligible effect on the private fund industry.  
Most importantly, 65% of private fund adviser respondents believed that 
their fund earnings were not affected by Title IV, and 75.4% opined that 
profits were not affected by the increased compliance requirements in Title 
IV.  A majority (74.5%) of private fund adviser respondents do not plan a 
strategic response to Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act.  A majority of 
 
 90.  Id.   
 91.  Id.   
 92.  Id.  
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respondents did take the regulatory regime into account before Dodd-Frank, 
implying that Dodd-Frank did not make much difference in the way 
respondents run their business.  However, of those who responded, 70.6% 
would not take the current regulatory regime into account in determining the 
AUM size of their funds.  While a majority of respondents (33.3%) prefer an 
AUM size of between $500 million and $1 billion, no clear majority emerges 
as to the preference pertaining to the $1.5 billion Form PF quarterly reporting 
threshold for larger funds.  And, a majority of adviser respondents (66.7%) 
did not take the $1.5 billion AUM threshold under Form PF for quarterly 
reporting into account in determining the appropriate size of AUM for the 
fund(s) they manage.  While 26.5% of respondents opined that there was no 
impact on their AUM preference, target investment opportunities and 
additional expenses did influence respondents’ AUM preferences.  
Moreover, private fund advisers in the sample did not terminate existing 
employment relationships.  Few respondents severed an advising 
relationship, changed funds’ (legal) structure, liquidated positions, changed 
investment styles, changed portfolio structure, or closed funds to new 
investors. 
Based on the findings in this study, the SEC’s attempts at clarifying and 
optimizing the legal framework post Dodd-Frank Act effectively supported 
the industry in its efforts to comply with the revised standards.  At the same 
time, there is sufficient evidence in the findings of this study suggesting that 
the SEC’s implementation and clarification of Dodd-Frank Act registration 
and reporting requirements for private funds also created uncertainty and 
higher costs for the industry. 
In summary, the second survey study shows that the private investment 
fund industry had adjusted well to the Title IV requirements.  The long-term 
impact of the evolving post Dodd-Frank Act regulatory landscape appeared 
to be much less intense than the industry initially anticipated.93  The long-
term cost implications of registration and reporting obligations as reported 
in this study appear to be absorbed relatively quickly after registration.94 
3. Private Fund Disclosures Under the Dodd-Frank Act 
Because the first survey study in the private investment fund manager 
registration context left many issues pertaining to private investment fund 
disclosures open, the author conducted a follow-on study in 2015.95  More 
specifically, because this author’s prior studies suggested that the SEC’s 
 
 93.  Id.   
 94.  Id. at 666-67.  
 95.  See generally Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures, supra note 9 (examining the 
consequences of the disclosure requirements on the private fund industry).  
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mandated collection of private fund data in Form PF created several core 
challenges for the private fund industry and for the SEC, the follow-on 
survey focused on the Dodd-Frank-mandated SEC collection of sensitive 
proprietary information from private fund advisers.  The key findings of the 
follow-on study quantified, evaluated, and clarified many core open issues 
with respect to the SEC’s efforts to collect private fund data through Form 
PF, including data in relation to:  (1) the required resources for completing 
Form PF, (2) shortcomings of and SEC guidance on Form PF (3) adequacy 
of filers’ reporting systems and service providers, and (4) issues associated 
with investor relations.  The author worked with the SEC in the context of 
the follow-on study to ensure that the SEC’s most pressing concerns 
pertaining to then new Form PF were included in the survey instrument. 
The key findings of the follow-on study indicated that the majority of 
private fund advisers responding to the survey incurred less than $10,000 to 
prepare their initial data reporting to the SEC, with the cost of subsequent 
annual Form PF filings at about half the initial cost.96  Larger private fund 
advisers, required to file quarterly, were faced with substantially higher 
compliance costs, both for their initial data reporting and for subsequent 
quarterly filings.97  While the SEC appeared to have overestimated the costs 
of Form PF compliance for larger private fund advisers, the data analysis in 
the follow-on study affirmed SEC cost estimates for smaller private fund 
advisers’ Form PF compliance costs.98 
The data analysis in the follow-on study suggested that the overall effect 
of private fund disclosure requirements on the private fund industry was 
moderate but could be further improved.  The majority of SEC-registered 
private fund advisers identified the ambiguity of Form PF data reporting 
requirements as the most pressing issue.99  However, the majority of 
respondents also considered their existing reporting systems adequate for 
capturing the information required by the SEC and agreed with the SEC’s 
definitions and instructions for Form PF. 
Several survey questions pertained to the purpose of Form PF and 
required filing resources.  Respondents identified the SEC’s objective of 
assessing systemic risk and the historical lack of private fund information 
provided by the industry to the SEC as the primary purposes of Form PF 
disclosure requirements.100  Commenters also argued that FSOC and Office 
of Financial Research (OFR) monitoring of risk, investment adviser 
examinations, and the collection of risk exposure information were 
 
 96.  Id. at 431, 469, 471.  
 97.  Id. at 469.  
 98.  Id. at 447–48.  
 99.  Id. at 431, 454, 470.  
 100.  Id. at 445, 464.  
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important purposes in the enactment of Form PF.101 
The completion and filing of Form PF required the commitment of 
resources from and expenditures by the private fund industry.  A majority of 
respondents (59.18%) stated that the additional expenditures required to 
complete and file Form PF for the first time were under $10,000.102  A 
majority of commenters (57.14%) identified the cost of subsequent annual 
Form PF filings at about half of the first-time filing cost, i.e., around $5,000.  
A breakdown of respondents by AUM suggested that larger private fund 
advisers, required to file quarterly, were faced with substantially higher 
compliance costs, both for their initial data reporting and for subsequent 
quarterly filings.103  The data does not identify the long-term costs for the 
private fund industry of having to complete and file Form PF on an annual 
or quarterly basis. 
The overall expenses necessary to complete and file Form PF 
correspond with resource requirements, such as the staff required to file 
Form PF and the total number of hours it took to complete Form PF.  A 
majority of respondents (67.35%) used only one to three individuals to 
complete Form PF.  Similarly, a majority of respondents (69.39%) indicated 
that it took staff less than 50 hours to complete Form PF.104 
The survey identified shortcomings in the design, definitions, and 
guidance of Form PF.  Respondents identified the burdensome nature and 
the ambiguity of Form PF as the most pressing issues with Form PF.105  While 
a majority of respondents (59.18%) agreed with the definitions or 
instructions in Form PF, respondents nevertheless argued that performance 
measures in Question 17, and counterparties and definitions of 
counterparties in Questions 22 and 23, required a level of interpretation.106  
The minority of respondents (40.82%) who disagreed with the definitions or 
instructions in Form PF generally disagreed with the definition of the term 
“funds.”  Commenters were equally split on whether Form PF questions 
pertaining to calculating regulatory assets under management (RAUM) 
required filers to interpret RAUM for purposes of completing Form PF. 
Most respondents appreciated both SEC guidance and SEC flexibility 
in responding to questions regarding Form PF.  A majority of respondents 
assessed the best level of SEC guidance in the context of their Form PF 
completion as sufficient or good.107  The majority of the commenters who 
 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 447, 465.  
 103.  Id. at 447–48, 465.  
 104.  Id. at 449-50, 465.  
 105.  Id. at 433, 452, 465.  
 106.  Id. at 453, 465.  
 107.  Id. at 429, 465.  
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believed that SEC guidance was inadequate indicated that SEC guidance was 
particularly unclear with respect to Section 1c, Item B (regarding Reporting 
Funds).  This was consistent with the responses that disagreed with the 
definition of funds in Form PF.  Most respondents (72.92%) agreed that the 
SEC’s flexibility in answering questions with respect to Form PF was 
helpful.  Commenters stated that SEC flexibility was valuable because it 
enabled respondents to interpret Form PF, it increased respondents’ ability 
to use their own internal methodologies, it helped them articulate their own 
assumptions, it clarified a lot of questions, and it simplified the completion 
of the form.108 
The survey identified the adequacy of private funds’ existing reporting 
systems utilized to capture the information required in Form PF.  A majority 
of respondents (65.22%) stated that their existing internal reporting systems 
adequately capture the information required by Form PF.109  More 
specifically, the majority of respondents did not encounter difficulties in 
identifying data responsive to questions about counterparty credit exposure, 
by using counterparties’ names on trading and/or legal records.  Several 
respondents (34.78%) opined that their existing internal reporting systems 
were insufficient to respond to questions on Form PF because they require 
further analysis and calculations. 
Survey respondents also largely (72.29%) abstained from employing a 
service-provider to complete Form PF.110  Firms’ ability to use existing 
internal reporting systems to complete Form PF is consistent with firms’ 
preference for completing Form PF in-house.  A majority of respondents 
actually suggested that Form PF can be completed in-house.  Others opined 
that completing Form PF would not justify the expense of hiring a service-
provider.  Commenters identified several challenges in working with a 
service-provider, including the investment of time and expenses to develop 
processes, and the burden of providing service-providers with the required 
information.  The minority of respondents who hired a service-provider 
stated they did so because of difficulties in aggregating the data and entering 
it directly without having an internal system to assist in the process; the 
service providers’ knowledge and their industry insight into answer 
methodology; a desire to ensure consistency in preparation; and the burden 
of how long it would take to complete Form PF in-house.111 
In summary, the findings of the follow-on survey study suggested that 
the overall effect of Form PF data reporting requirements on the private fund 
industry was less severe than widely expected by the industry.  In light of the 
 
 108.  Id. at 457, 465.  
 109.  Id. at 459, 466.  
 110.  Id. at 461, 466. 
 111.  Id. at 462, 466.  
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cost data provided by the study (for both smaller and larger private fund 
advisers),
 
industry concerns that mandatory private fund adviser registration 
and disclosure requirements could inappropriately burden investment 
advisers
 
seemed to be mostly unfounded.  The results of the follow-on study 
complemented earlier findings suggesting that the private fund industry 
adjusted well to the reporting obligations mandated by Title IV. 
Nevertheless, the data analysis and the findings of the study indicated 
several areas of concern with existing Form PF questions and requirements.  
Important issues include the ambiguity of several key questions in Form PF; 
the time constraints required to answer certain questions, such as Question 
16 (types of investors), Question 17 (performance), and Question 7 (related 
persons); respondents’ disagreement with the definition of funds; and the 
lack of adequate SEC guidance for Section 1c, Item B (information regarding 
reporting fund).112  Other issues identified in the study pertain to the 
insufficiency of existing reporting systems for some firms; difficulties in 
aggregating the required Form PF data and entering it directly without the 
availability of a system to assist in the process; and challenges in working 
with a service-provider, including process development and the burden of 
providing service-providers with the required information.113 
4. Dodd-Frank Act—Comparative Evidence 2012 and 2015 
In an effort to understand the consistency of short-term and long-term 
surveys on the impact of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, the author’s 
comparative survey study examined the private fund industry’s reactions and 
adjustments to a rapidly evolving regulatory framework three years after the 
first application of mandatory registration and disclosure rules for private 
fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act.114  To add a historical time series 
perspective via this comparative survey study, the author used two datasets 
(2012: N = 94; 2015: N = 69) for a population of 1,267 registered investment 
advisers.  The author analyzed and compared survey respondents’ short- and 
long-term estimations of industry effects.115  The data suggested that 
immediate and short-term concerns had given way to adaptation to the 
changes. 
The comparative survey study indicated that compliance costs 
associated with the evolving regulatory environment for private fund 
advisers had many unexpected consequences that had the potential to further 
 
 112.  Id. at 451, 453-56, 467.  
 113.  Id. at 467.  
 114.  Kaal, Evolution, supra note 4, at 1151.  
 115.  Id. at 1151, 1154.  
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shape industry practices.116  Several developments are particularly 
noteworthy.  While in both the 2012 and 2015 surveys a majority (72% and 
75%, respectively) of respondents did not plan a strategic response to Title 
IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, in 2015 a substantially higher rate of respondents 
(47% in 2015 versus 25% in 2012) suggested that they changed their 
communications with investors.117  This was consistent with anecdotal 
evidence suggesting that since the 2012 survey, private fund advisers had 
changed and increased their communications with investors, often based on 
advice from counsel.  In a legal environment where SEC examinations, 
enforcement actions, and major settlements define the rules promulgated 
following the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, it had become increasingly 
important for private fund advisers to communicate with investors, 
emphasizing the effect of these new conditions on fund operations.118  The 
comparative data also suggested that the industry is increasingly doing such 
work in-house.  This is consistent with the SEC’s emphasis on COO liability 
and subsequent enforcement actions since 2012 that have focused on 
compliance departments.   Moreover, the comparative data suggest that since 
2012 at least a part of the industry was closing funds to new investors and 
even changing funds’ legal structures in response to the evolving regulatory 
landscape.119 
Perhaps the most important findings of the comparative survey study 
pertained to the comparative and long-term implications of the compliance 
costs associated with the evolving post-Dodd-Frank-Act regulatory 
environment and its effect on private fund advisers.120  The comparative data 
suggested that between 2012 and 2015 the industry was subject to an overall 
higher cost structure.121  The annual cost of compliance doubled for many 
survey respondents, moving from the $50,000 to $100,000 range to the 
$100,000 to $200,000 range.  The survey provided evidence that the industry 
became more effective from 2012 to 2015 in its compliance with obligations 
related to the Dodd-Frank Act.122   However, assuming that compliance hour 
requirements were a proxy for compliance cost, the comparative data 
suggested that the cost structure for all federal regulation increased between 
2012 and 2015.123 
Comparative data on the possible impact of the evolving regulatory 
environment on the AUM of private investment fund advisers facilitated an 
 
 116.  Id. at 1198.  
 117.  Id. at 1185, 1198-1201.  
 118.  Id. at 1201.  
 119.  Id. at 1201.  
 120.  Id.   
 121.  Id.  
 122.  Id. at 1201. 
 123.  Id.  
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analysis of the implications of rulemaking on the industry’s evolution.  That 
data suggested that investment advisers of private funds were increasingly 
taking the regulatory structure into account when determining their AUM.124  
It showed that the 2015 survey respondents preferred a higher AUM than the 
2012 survey respondents.  Whereas, in 2012, 29% of survey respondents had 
an AUM preference in the range from $150 million to $500 million, and only 
16% preferred a $500 million to $1 billion AUM, in 2015 these figures had 
reversed; only 15% of respondents had an AUM preference in the range from 
$150 million to $500 million, and 33% of respondents preferred a $500 
million to $1 billion AUM.125  While this finding could be partially explained 
with the higher overall post-Dodd-Frank-Act cost structure for the industry, 
it was inconsistent with private fund advisers’ general tendency to grow 
AUM to increase profitability. 
To ensure that as much as possible of the net management fee becomes 
compensation for the managers, investment advisers typically try to allocate 
as many operating expenses to the fund as possible.  Nevertheless, the 
comparative data provided in the survey study suggested that the additional 
regulatory obligations imposed on the private investment fund industry in 
the aftermath of the tectonic regulatory shift stemming from the Dodd-Frank 
Act influenced AUM preferences.  From a policy perspective, changing 
AUM preferences associated with compliance costs could eventually result 
in consolidations that facilitate cost savings or precipitate a trend towards 
family offices that do not manage third-party assets. 
The impact of the evolving post-Dodd-Frank Act regulatory 
environment on investment advisers’ profitability had raised industry-wide 
concerns.  Nevertheless, the majority of survey respondents in both the 2012 
survey (76.1%) and the 2015 survey (65%) believed that the Dodd-Frank Act 
did not affect reporting funds’ earnings.126  Of those respondents who did 
believe that the Act affected their reporting funds’ earnings, the comparative 
data suggested that between 2012 and 2015 investment advisers saw the 
costs on fund earnings increasingly associated with opportunity costs (2012: 
9%; 2015: 32%) rather than with increased expenses (2012: 53%; 2015: 
36%).127  This was consistent with anecdotal evidence suggesting that the 
industry largely absorbed the increased expenses associated with the Dodd-
Frank Act through the increasing use of pass-through expense terms when 
 
 124.  Id. at 1190-92, 1201.  
 125.  Id. at 1193, 1202.  
 126.  See id. at 1195, 1202 (reviewing the results of a survey looking at how Dodd-Frank 
influenced AUM preferences, amidst a discussion that investment advisers try to increase the 
amount of operating expenses allocated to funds).  
 127.  See id. at 1202 (continuing to share the results of a survey used to determine how 
Dodd-Frank influenced AUM preferences).  
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structuring investment adviser and private fund relationships between 2012 
and 2015.128 
The private fund industry had long voiced concerns about the long-term 
implications of the evolving regulatory environment on investment advisers’ 
reporting funds.  The comparative survey study suggested that the long-term 
effects of that environment were more substantial than the industry and 
regulators initially anticipated.129  A greater percentage of 2015 responses, 
compared to 2012 responses, made references to “lower returns” and plans 
to “consolidate or close funds,” which seemed to suggest a more substantial 
effect on reporting funds.130  Confirming these trends, 2012 and 2015 
estimates predicted the state of the private fund industry over the next five 
years and also made references to additional expenses and barriers to entry 
to the private fund market.  Whereas in the 2012 survey only 24% of 
respondents referenced barriers to entry for small firms, in 2015, 33% made 
such references. 
5. What Drives Dodd-Frank Act Compliance Costs for Private 
Funds? 
Using the unprecedented compliance cost estimates from the earlier 
survey studies,131 this author applied multiple regression analyses to evaluate 
the possible drivers and effects of Title IV Dodd-Frank Act compliance costs 
on the private fund industry.132  Using hand-selected compliance cost 
estimates from private fund advisers (N=94), the study showed with two 
independent datasets that the number of funds managed by private fund 
advisers was associated with Dodd-Frank Act compliance costs. 
The study demonstrated that the size of registered private fund advisers 
as measured by AUM was not associated with the per-unit cost of Title IV 
compliance and other independent variables as proxies for cost.  These 
findings were consistent with the hypothesis that the cost of financial 
 
 128.  See id. (discussing how the survey looking at how Dodd-Frank influenced AUM 
preferences is consistent with anecdotal evidence).  
 129.  See id. at 1202 (arguing that the survey examining how Dodd-Frank influenced 
AUM preferences indicates that Dodd-Frank had a more extreme impact than regulators 
expected).  
 130.  Id. at 1197, 1199, 1202-03.  
 131.  Survey results indicate that the majority of hedge fund advisers and private fund 
advisers expect Dodd-Frank related compliance costs to range from $50,000 to $200,000.  See 
Kaal, Registration, supra note 9, at 298; Kaal, Private Fund Industry, supra note Error! 
Bookmark not defined., at 650; Kaal, Evolution, supra note 4 at 1186.   
 132.  See Kaal, Compliance Costs, supra note 9, at 8 (describing the study design, which 
included four dependent variables with data obtained from prior surveys: cost of compliance, 
median cost measures, annual time required for compliance, and median annual time 
measures for compliance).  
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regulation under the Dodd-Frank Act brought increasing returns to scale.133  
These results of the study confirmed the findings in other studies suggesting 
that regulatory compliance costs can bring increasing returns to scale.134 
A significant long-term implication of the results included the creation 
of barriers to entry for smaller private fund advisers.  In other words, if Title 
IV compliance costs bring increasing returns to scale because the costs of 
Title IV compliance favor larger firms, Title IV requirements may contribute 
to the creation of barriers to entry for smaller private fund advisers.135  This 
author demonstrated in this study that barriers to entry also mean that smaller 
private fund advisers could get forced out of the market or consolidate with 
other private fund advisers.  Consolidation of smaller private fund advisers, 
in turn, can contribute further to an already existing trend towards private 
fund adviser consolidation. 
The study introduces for the first time possible dynamic elements in the 
regulation of the private investment fund industry.  The literature on dynamic 
regulation emphasizes adaptable institutions and rulemaking processes to 
overcome suboptimal governance outcomes.136  Rules can become adaptable 
if institutions and rulemaking processes integrate feedback effects, including 
feedback effects between the industry and regulators, that produce timely, 
relevant, and decentralized information for rulemaking ex-ante before rule-
makers finalize rules.137  By increasing the availability of relevant 
 
 133.  See id. at 22-23 (discussing the results of the multiple regression, including how the 
increasing returns to scale result from a high up-front regulatory cost with significantly less 
costly subsequent reporting obligations).  
 134.  See id. at 23 (synthesizing the results of the multiple regression with prior research).  
 135.  See id. at 23 (explaining why compliance costs impose a barrier-on-entry to smaller 
firms).  
 136.  See e.g., Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law: Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional 
Economics Framework, in FESTSCHRIFT ZU EHREN VON CHRISTIAN KIRCHNER 1211 (Wulf A. 
Kaal, Matthias Schmidt & Andreas Schwartze eds., 2014); Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation 
via Governmental Contracts, in ROBERT WALDBURGER ET AL., LAW & ECONOMICS: 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR PETER NOBEL ZUM 70 GEBURTSTAG  65, 66 (2015) (advocating for the use 
of governmental contracts to enable feedback processes, which in turn facilitate institution-
specific ex-ante experimentation that allow for rulemaking to adapt to future contingencies); 
Wulf A. Kaal & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive Innovation - From Facts 
to Data 57 JURIMETRICS 169, 171-72, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808044 [https://perma.cc/3
4Q4-46QT] [hereinafter Kaal, Disruptive Innovation] (explaining how the current regulatory 
rulemaking process, which emphasizes ex-post facts-based trial-and-error rulemaking, leads 
to suboptimal outcomes because the pattern of disruptive innovation doesn’t provide the time 
needed for fact gathering); Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation, in PERSPECTIV
ES IN LAW, BUSINESS AND INNOVATION (Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Toshiyuki Kono & Erik 
P.M. Vermeulen eds., https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831040) [https://perma.cc/K7JQ-855F] 
[hereinafter Kaal, Dynamic Regulation] (arguing that dynamic regulatory processes can solve 
the problem of innovation developing faster applicable regulations, or the so-called “pacing 
problem”). 
 137.  See Kaal, Dynamic Regulation, supra note 136 at 17-20 (describing the use of 
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information for ex-ante rulemaking, dynamic regulation lowers unforeseen 
contingencies in the rulemaking process while increasing regulatory 
certainty.  Identifying forms of dynamic regulation for the private investment 
fund industry has the potential to overcome many of the identified policy 
challenges associated with Title IV.138 
6. Dodd-Frank Impact on Private Fund Performance 
As previously noted, an important question repeatedly raised by the 
private investment fund industry lobby pertains to the impact of Title IV on 
private investment fund performance and profitability.  Attempts to rescind 
Title IV via the Investment Advisers Modernization Act of 2016 and 
announcements of the Trump Administration pertaining to a reduction of the 
regulatory burden in the Dodd-Frank Act illustrate the highly politically 
sensitive nature of Dodd-Frank Act registration and disclosure obligations 
for the private fund industry. 
The author’s 2015 paper exploits a natural quasi-experiment to isolate 
the effects that were uniquely due to Title IV: private fund investment 
advisers with AUM of more than $150 million are required to register with 
the SEC and are subject to substantially increased public disclosure 
obligations.139  To analyze the effect of Title IV on the private fund industry, 
this author and two co-authors used five years of private fund advisers’ 
performance data with over 7,000 reporting private funds in a regression 
discontinuity (RD) design, using multiple hand-selected control groups and 
several iterations of broad and narrow RD designs and robustness checks. 
The findings in this paper are consistent and do not support the private 
fund industry’s claims that the increased supervision and disclosure 
mandated in the Dodd-Frank Act have a negative effect on private fund 
earnings.  Using an array of robustness tests validating the RD results, the 
paper shows that the requirements introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act create 
no significant effect on private fund performance.  The P-values for all RD 
results are above the 5% level and confirm the finding of no affect.  By 
contrast, the private fund industry expected the introduction of the Dodd-
Frank Act to result in negative effects on private investment fund returns.  
The absence of any statistically significant effect of mandatory disclosure on 
 
various types of feedback effects in dynamic regulation).  
 138.  Cf. id. at 20-21 (positing that deferred-prosecution-agreements and venture capital 
investments demonstrate where innovation is trending such that they can be used as feedback 
processes within dynamic regulation).  
 139.  See Kaal, Luppi, & Paterlini, supra note 9 (describing a study that is attempting to 
quantify the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act disclosure requirements on private fund 
performance). 
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hedge fund returns may suggest that the transparency costs associated with 
disclosure do not significantly affect the profitability of hedge fund advisers. 
B. Systemic Risk 
The public media, politicians, and regulators regularly debate the 
potential for private investment funds to contribute to systemic risk in 
financial markets.  Because the private investment fund industry experienced 
substantial growth over the past two decades, concerns about hedge funds’ 
systemic risk have increased, and regulators have taken measures to mitigate 
the possible risks associated with these funds.  The Dodd-Frank Act created 
the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) with the primary 
mandate of guarding against systemic risk and correcting perceived 
regulatory weaknesses that may have contributed to the financial crisis of 
2008-09.  The SEC collects data pertaining to private fund advisers in order 
to facilitate the FSOC’s assessment of non-bank financial institutions’ 
potential systemic risks. 
In a first paper on private investment funds’ systemic risk implications, 
this author evaluated the Dodd-Frank Act’s potential to address the systemic 
risk implications of private investment funds.140  The paper created and 
evaluated data evidence that demonstrated that the SEC’s data collection 
encountered accuracy and consistency problems that hampered the FSOC’s 
ability to evaluate the systemic risk of private funds.141  The author showed 
that while the SEC’s data played a crucial role in all stages of FSOC’s 
systemic risk assessment of private funds, the FSOC relied most heavily on 
some of the most problematic disclosure items collected by the SEC. 
The paper demonstrated that the data collected via Form PF had several 
core shortcomings.  These included: the ambiguity of several key questions 
on Form PF, the inaccuracy of Form PF definitions and the corresponding 
insufficiency of SEC guidance for Form PF, and difficulties in aggregating 
the required Form PF information.142
 
By referencing the author’s prior work and using the data collected in 
surveys to analyze the systemic risk of private investment funds,143 the paper 
 
 140.  See Kaal, Systemic Risk, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 167-69 
(detailing how the Dodd-Frank Act empowered the SEC to promulgate rules intended to 
mitigate the private fund industry’s potential systemic risk, and how, despite challenges, the 
SEC’s chosen method, collection of data through Form PF, has been accepted by the industry).  
 141.  See id. at 190–93 (sharing the results of the analysis, demonstrating Form PF data 
insufficiency and possible inaccuracy).  
 142.  See id. at 191 (citing his own prior work to demonstrate shortcomings of Form PF).  
 143.  See Kaal, Systemic Risk, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 168 (citing 
two essays as indicating that the mandated data collection in Form PF could cause difficulties 
for FSOC in evaluating the systemic risk of hedge funds); Registration, supra note 9; Kaal, 
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demonstrated that the systemic risk assessment process employed by the 
FSOC was suboptimal.144  Several core Form PF questions that provide 
specific information for FSOC’s stage one threshold assessment encounter 
problems.  More specifically, the definition of RAUM required substantive 
interpretation by filers.  FSOC used valuations in Form PF that are associated 
with RAUM, such as gross asset value of reporting fund (Question 8), the 
value of derivative positions (Questions 13 and 44), financing information 
and financing liquidity (Questions 46 and 58), as well as gross and net assets 
value of reporting fund (Questions 8 and 9) to determine various stage one 
thresholds.  Given FSOC’s direct or indirect use of RAUM-related data (and 
FSOC’s emphasis on such data), in combination with the author’s prior study 
suggesting that RAUM requires substantial interpretation,
 
the paper showed 
that it was at least questionable if FSOC would be able to use the related 
Form PF data effectively and sustainably for its systemic risk evaluations 
and the designation of non-bank financial companies as systemically risky.145
 
The paper further showed that in addition to the specific matching of 
Form PF data issues with FSOC’s uses of Form PF data, Form PF data may 
also have presented several more generic areas of concern for FSOC’s 
systemic risk evaluation.146  Over 40% of respondents in the author’s prior 
study suggested that they disagreed with definitions or instructions in Form 
PF.147
  
This suggested that a large proportion of filers are uncertain as to how 
Form PF questions are to be answered.  This uncertainty raised the possibility 
that the filers were using estimates and a variety of assumptions to complete 
Form PF.148  If FSOC relied on Form PF data in its systemic risk assessment 
that is subject to inaccuracies, the paper suggested that that FSOC’s work 
pertaining to private funds could in turn be subject to errors.149 
In a second paper on private investment funds’ possible systemic risk, 
the author showed that private investment fund advisers’ systemic risk 
disclosure obligations under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act and SEC 
implementation rules had unanticipated knock-on effects on other areas of 
the law and hedge fund practices.  More specifically, Federal Bankruptcy 
Rule 2019 (Rule 2019) had been the subject of intense professional and 
scholarly debate before the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act.150  The federal 
 
Private Fund Disclosures, supra note 9.  
 144.  See Kaal, Systemic Risk, supra note 10, at 190-193 (discussing the sub-optimality of 
systemic risk data).  
 145.  See id. at 192-93.  
 146.  See id. at 193.  
 147.  See Kaal, Private Fund Disclosures, supra note 9, at 26 (indicating that 40.82% of 
respondents disagreed with definitions or instructions in Form PF).  
 148.  See Kaal, Systemic Risk, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 193.  
 149.  See id. at 193.  
 150.  See Kaal, Bankruptcy, supra note 9, at 195. 
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bankruptcy bench, practitioners, and academics debated the importance of 
the purported purpose of Rule 2019, the necessity for hedge funds to protect 
trading strategies and proprietary information, and the role of creditors and 
groups of creditors in the bankruptcy process.  This paper added another 
element to the debate by evaluating possible implications of systemic risk 
disclosures by hedge fund managers under Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act 
and SEC implementation rules in the bankruptcy context.  In the paper, the 
author provided evidence of a substantial overlap between systemic risk 
disclosure requirements under Title IV and the disclosure requirements 
under the fully-revised version of Bankruptcy Rule 2019 (Revised Rule 
2019).151 
The paper demonstrated that public access to systemic risk disclosures 
by hedge fund managers under the Dodd-Frank Act and SEC implementation 
rules could improve hedge funds’ distressed investments and their 
bankruptcy practices.152  Systemic risk disclosures could play a possible role 
in bankruptcy especially if more evidence emerges suggesting that Revised 
Rule 2019 could result in less overall disclosure by distressed debt investors.  
The mere threat of public access or sharing of hedge funds’ systemic risk 
data filings in Form PF filings between the SEC and the federal bankruptcy 
bench could help facilitate some level of discipline for distressed debt 
investors’ engagements in the bankruptcy process.153  The commonalities 
between disclosure requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act and Revised 
Rule 2019 suggested a possible role for systemic risk disclosures in the 
bankruptcy process. 
The paper highlighted that the threat of public disclosure of systemic 
risk filings by hedge funds via the bankruptcy process only marginally 
affected hedge funds’ tactics and their role in distressed investing.154  Hedge 
funds’ disclosure obligations under the Dodd-Frank Act were then still rather 
generic.  The SEC had not yet standardized the requirements, and it was 
unclear if the SEC would expand the systemic risk disclosure obligations for 
hedge funds investing in distressed securities.  The paper asserted that the 
hedge fund industry’s continuous, expanding, and increasingly assertive 
presence in distressed securities investments could change this evaluation in 
the future.155 
In a third paper, published five years after the enactment of the Dodd-
Frank Act, this author summarized the pre- and post-crisis debate and 
 
 151.  See id. at 195.  
 152.  See id. at 232. 
 153.  See id. at 200–01, 226, 232–33.  
 154.  See id. at 201, 232. 
 155.  See id. at 225 (predicting that some of the discussed risk disclosures may become 
more relevant for the bankruptcy process going forward).  
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highlighted and contrasted the post-crisis evidence regarding hedge funds’ 
alleged systemic risk.156  In particular, the author examined evidence 
regarding specific factors surrounding hedge funds’ possible contributions 
to systemic risk, including risk management incentives, leverage, liquidity 
characteristics, regulation, financial stability, transparency, and their 
potential to induce and perpetuate market contagion.157 
The paper outlined the empirical evidence on hedge funds’ possible 
systemic risk in the aftermath of the 2007–08 financial crisis.158  Several 
theoretical academic studies pointed to the potential for a possible link 
between hedge funds and systemic risk, especially as it relates to liquidity.  
Another strand of literature examined in the paper evaluated the potential for 
“tail risk” induced by hedge funds’ risk management incentives that may 
increase risk-taking and leverage while shrinking hedge fund liquidity.159  
The paper evaluated academic studies examining several additional factors 
in this process, including hedge funds’ exposures to macroeconomic risks, 
their contribution to a “shadow banking” system, and the potential for hedge 
funds to induce and perpetuate market contagion. 
C. Private Fund Investor Due Diligence 
Since 2010, investment due diligence has become an increasingly 
litigated issue in the capital formation and allocation process.160  Lock step 
with the growth of the private investment fund industry, private fund investor 
due diligence litigation has increased significantly since the financial crisis 
of 2008-09.  Courts in the early 2010s started to set out private fund investor 
due diligence standards and provided guidance on the requirements and 
limits of due diligence.  The increasing due diligence litigation record 
underscores the heightened importance of due diligence in the capital 
formation and allocation process since the financial crisis of 2008-09. 
Despite the increasing relevance of investment due diligence in the 
capital formation and allocation process and despite increasing litigation in 
the context of investment due diligence, the industry is mostly left to its own 
devices to ensure adequate due diligence standards apply.  Little to no 
 
 156.  See Kaal & Krause, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 3-21 (outlining 
the debate regarding the potential for hedge funds to contribute to systemic risk in financial 
markets and examining evidence about specific factors surrounding hedge funds’ possible 
contributions to systemic risk). 
 157.  See id. at 1. 
 158.  See id. at 12–19 (summarizing empirical evidence gathered by several scholars 
before concluding that hedge funds may play a role in introducing at least some systemic risk 
into the financial system).  
 159.  See id. at 20.  
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guidance existed prior to the author’s study on applicable standards for 
private investment fund due diligence.  Available resources describe best 
practices but do not sufficiently outline the legal requirements pertaining to 
private investment fund due diligence.  The available case law only 
marginally provides relevant guidance on private fund investor due 
diligence. 
The author’s study provided the first comprehensive evaluation of the 
changing private fund investor due diligence landscape.161  To provide the 
industry with data, data trend analyses, and guidance on applicable legal 
private fund investor due diligence standards, the author examined two 
datasets:  (1) private investment fund advisers’ SEC Form ADV II filings 
from 2007 to 2014 (N=100392), and (2) the publicly available litigation 
record pertaining to private fund investor due diligence from 1995 to 2015 
(N=572).  After highlighting important changes in the quality and quantity 
of private fund investor due diligence disclosures in SEC Form ADV Part II, 
the author summarized and illustrated the entire litigation record on private 
investment fund due diligence from 1995 to 2015, breaking down individual 
expert testimony provided by due diligence experts in courts and evaluating 
expert guidance on applicable investor due diligence best practices.162 
To summarize the results, the data provided in the author’s study 
suggested that since 2010 private fund advisers increasingly engaged in 
private fund investor due diligence, partially in an effort to protect 
themselves from investor criticism and lawsuits.163  Since 2010, an increasing 
number of SEC Form ADV II brochure filers included investor due diligence 
disclosures, and the number of filers who included those disclosures 
remained relatively even between 2012 and 2014.  The quantity of investor 
due diligence disclosures relative to total SEC Form ADV II brochure filings 
had increased substantially; the due diligence count exceeded the total ADV 
II filings for the first time in 2014.  Filers appeared to see a need to increase 
the quantity of investor due diligence disclosures in Form ADV II between 
2011 and 2014.  The increasing caseload on private fund investor due 
diligence since 2005 could have suggested that applicable legal standards 
needed to be further clarified.164 
The data used in the study demonstrated that between 1995 and 2015 
private fund investor due diligence had reached new and lasting prominence 
in the court system.165  Madoff-related cases in the aftermath of the discovery 
of the Madoff Ponzi scheme in 2008 only partially explained the significant 
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increase in the prevalence and importance of private fund investor due 
diligence after 2009.  The study demonstrated that the legal standards 
applicable to private fund investor due diligence were somewhat inconsistent 
and suboptimal and merited clarification. 
In the study, the author predicted that the heightened emphasis on 
private fund investor due diligence as demonstrated in the study 
foreshadowed the possibility of standardization of private fund investor due 
diligence.166  Lack of standards for private fund investor due diligence could 
partially be attributed to private funds’ unique position in markets — unlike 
mutual funds, private funds evolved as unregistered entities, free from most 
regulatory oversight.  Accordingly, private fund investor due diligence 
evolved without regulatory oversight.  The study suggested that private 
investment fund due diligence may follow the same evolution as banks’ risk 
evaluation.  Whereas in the early 2000s banks operated with general risk 
evaluation strategies but no uniformity and no applicable standards, today 
banks’ risk evaluation is heavily regulated and turned into a science. 
IV. CONFLUENCE OF PRIVATE AND MUTUAL FUNDS 
Increasing evidence suggests that the traditional distinction between 
mutual and private funds is dissipating.  Prior to the 2008-09 credit crisis, 
the asset management industry was bifurcated into two distinct product 
segments, regulated (mutual) funds and private funds.  That traditional 
distinction between mutual and private funds is dissipating.  The author’s 
contributions in this context167 conceptualized the confluence between 
mutual funds and private investment funds as a process and identified a trend 
that alternative mutual funds and other products that are fundamentally 
mutual funds are increasingly becoming more like hedge funds.168  The 
articles show that changes pertaining to hedge funds in the regulatory 
framework post Dodd-Frank Act tend to render hedge funds and hedge-fund-
like vehicles more mutual-fund-like.  This is not just a result of more 
stringent regulations enacted via the Dodd-Frank Act in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis; the liberalization of the advertising restrictions post Dodd-
Frank Act also makes hedge funds more like mutual funds. 
Several factors suggest that mutual funds are becoming more like hedge 
 
 166.  Id. at 60.  
 167.  Kaal, Confluence, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.; Kaal & Anderson, 
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
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KAAL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/2018  3:22 PM 
614 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 20.3 
 
funds as a matter of investment strategy, while hedge funds are becoming 
more like mutual funds as a matter of the regulatory framework.169  The 
factors that perhaps best illustrate the confluence of private and mutual funds 
include the growth of the private fund industry and the proliferation of retail 
alternative funds in combination with the fundamental reshaping of the 
regulatory landscape for the private fund industry.170  Market-driven factors 
contributing to this confluence include the emergence and proliferation of 
so-called retail alternative or hybrid funds, such as synthetic hedge funds and 
unconstrained mutual funds.  Other important confluence factors include the 
increasing side-by-side management of mutual funds and hedge funds, and 
public offerings of alternative asset managers, among others, in combination 
with the fundamental reshaping of the regulatory landscape for the hedge 
fund industry through the Dodd-Frank Act
 
and the JOBS Act.171 
Since the early 2010’s, both private and regulated fund managers have 
been offering “liquid” alternative products to the same investor segments.  
Liquid alternatives offer adequate management fees and strong growth 
potential for mutual fund managers.  For private managers, liquid alternative 
products provide access to large asset pools, including defined contribution 
plans, which were otherwise unavailable to private fund advisers.  Increased 
offerings of liquid alternatives are managers’ response to investor demands 
for a combination of risk mitigation, liquidity, the lower fees associated with 
mutual funds, and the absolute returns of private funds.  Investments in liquid 
alternatives have more than doubled since 2008 and represent over $550 
billion in assets.172 
Retail investors’ preferences are a major factor in the confluence of 
private and mutual funds.  Retail investors gained access to private fund 
strategies and higher returns through liquid alternative funds.  In fact, the 
overall demand in the alternative investment sector is largely driven by retail 
investors who seek not only the prospect of significant performance but also 
risk-adjusted and consistent returns that are not correlated to the market.173 
 
 169.  Id.   
 170.  Id. at 1.  
 171.  Id. at 3.  
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 173.  See MCKINSEY & COMPANY, THE TRILLION-DOLLAR CONVERGENCE: CAPTURING THE 
NEXT WAVE OF GROWTH IN ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS, 3 (2014) (“Retail investors, 
meanwhile, are moving rapidly into the market, as new product vehicles provide 
unprecedented access to a broad range of alternatives managers and strategies.  Structural, 
rather than cyclical, forces are accelerating the adoption of alternatives, chief among them the 
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alternatives was the prospect of high-octane performance.  The market meltdown caused by 
the global financial crisis, coupled with the extended period of volatility and macroeconomic 
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Through liquid alternatives retail investors were able to merely pay mutual 
fund fees, which in turn increased demand by retail investors for liquid 
alternatives.174 
A. Evidence 
The emergence and proliferation of unconstrained mutual funds 
(“UMFs”) provides important evidence illustrating the phenomenon of 
confluence between mutual and private funds.175  UMFs display 
characteristics of both mutual funds and private funds, and they occupy a 
unique market niche.  More specifically, by combining the regulatory 
structure of a mutual fund with the investment strategy employed by a private 
fund implementing a credit strategy and principally trading fixed income 
instruments,
 
UMFs transcend several of the traditional investment and legal 
distinctions which have characterized mutual funds and private funds.176  
UMFs are subject to the same regulatory framework as traditional mutual 
funds, and they are widely offered and available to retail investors who 
would otherwise be excluded from investments in private investment funds. 
The author provides evidence that UMFs share multiple investment 
strategies and risk attributes with fixed income hedge funds.  Analyzing 
trading data and prospectuses of a hand-selected sample of all unconstrained 
mutual funds launched from 2010 through 2015 (N=449), the author 
provided an overview of the evolution of unconstrained mutual funds, 
contrasting core characteristics with publicly available data pertaining to 
benchmarked mutual fund investment indices.177 
UMFs exceeded the typical mutual fund “engagements” in almost all 
quantifiable categories.  The data analysis in the study demonstrated that 
UMF trading of the referenced security and contract types clearly exceeded 
the average “engagements” for mutual funds as a group.178  For instance, in 
terms of short selling, UMFs exceeded other funds by more than twenty 
percent in engagements.  Similarly, in currency exchange transactions, 
UMFs exceeded other funds by almost 30%, in restricted securities by over 
40%, and in interest rates futures by over 50%.  Investment categories where 
 
uncertainty that followed, have left their marks, and investors are now turning to alternatives 
for consistent, risk-adjusted returns that are uncorrelated to the market.  They are also 
increasingly looking to alternatives to deliver on other crucial outcomes like inflation 
protection and income generation.”); id. at 15 (“[R]etail flows are expected to be three to four 
times those of institutional flows.  Demand has been strongest in the U.S. market . . . .”). 
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UMFs exceeded other funds by around 20% include options on futures, 
options on stock indexes, options on debt securities, and options on 
equities.179 
Moreover, UMFs consistently exceeded mutual funds in relation to 
almost all investment categories.  In particular, UMFs exceeded other mutual 
fund “permissions” by around 10–20% in short selling, currency exchange 
transactions, securities of foreign issuers, restricted securities, commodity 
futures, options on index futures, options on futures, stock index futures, 
interest rate futures, options on stock indexes, options on debt securities, and 
options on equities.180  UMFs also used a significantly higher proportion of 
short sales (as a percentage of their respective Net Asset Value (NAVs)) than 
other mutual funds.  They also displayed a substantially higher turnover rate 
than other mutual funds trading fixed income instruments.  In particular, 
UMF turnover on average exceeded the turnover for other fixed income 
mutual funds by over 150%.181  Finally, UMF fees generally exceed those of 
other mutual funds.  While the average fee charged by a UMF (1.40%) 
exceeds the average fee charged by those mutual funds in the Morningstar 
“non-traditional category” (1.25%) and the average fee charged by all credit 
mutual funds as a group (1.15%), the fees charged by UMFs are only 
marginally higher than those charged by other mutual funds.182 
B. Implications 
The confluence of mutual and private funds has long-term implications 
for both the private and mutual fund industries.  The confluence of mutual 
and hedge funds affects the evolution of the hedge fund industry, rendering 
it a more widely recognized industry that is part of mainstream of finance.183  
Confluence factors also make governance alternatives and possible 
governance improvements available for the mutual fund industry.  Other 
implications include a positive effect on the growth of the retail alternative 
fund market and possible support for the proposition that the public/private 
distinction in federal securities regulation may be dissipating.  Moreover, the 
confluence of mutual and investment funds through the proliferation of 
UMFs calls into question the effectiveness of retail investor protections 
under the Investment Companies Act of 1940.184 
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Factors associated with the confluence of mutual and hedge funds help 
the private investment fund industry transition from an industry operating at 
the fringes of finance to one recognized as part of mainstream finance.185  
Private investment funds have been able to proliferate and increasingly 
attract investors due in part to the Federal Reserve’s policies and resulting 
low interest rates in the early 2010s.  Unprecedented changes in the rules and 
regulations pertaining to the private investment fund industry under Title IV 
of the Dodd-Frank Act and the JOBS Act
 
allow increased oversight of the 
industry and contribute to the increasing recognition of the industry as a fully 
regulated asset class.186 
The confluence of mutual and hedge funds can also influence mutual 
fund governance.  Given the proliferation of that confluence, it is possible 
that other governance models for mutual funds emerge over time.  The 
proliferation of multimanager series trusts, for example, established a 
hitherto nonexistent alternative governance model for mutual funds.  
Multimanager series trusts can support mutual fund governance.  Unlike the 
board in a traditional mutual fund governance setting, the board in a 
multimanager series trust arrangement is largely independent of any advisers 
within the fund group.  Thus, independent directors on the board are not 
subject to conflicts of interest that often exist in traditional mutual fund 
governance settings if directors are affiliated with the investment adviser.  
Apart from its involvement in approving each adviser in a group structure, 
the board in the trust setting also typically has no involvement in selecting 
the group’s investment advisers, creating fewer incentives for the board to 
comport with advisers in contradiction of fiduciary obligations.  Despite the 
open issues and possible shortcomings of the multimanager series trust 
model, the trust model governance structure for mutual funds appears to offer 
lasting substantive governance improvements for mutual funds.187 
Factors of mutual and hedge fund confluence increase the demand for 
retail alternative funds.  While the market-driven proliferation of retail 
alternative funds itself drives confluence, several additional nonmarket 
confluence factors support the growth of the market for alternative funds.  
For instance, several provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act revised legal 
requirements applicable to private investment funds that in effect assimilated 
the legal requirements of mutual and hedge funds.  Merging the regulatory 
requirements applicable to mutual funds with the formerly more distinct 
rules applicable to private investment funds creates incentives for private 
investment managers to set up retail alternative funds.188  A higher supply of 
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retail alternative funds, in turn, is likely to further increase investor demand 
for retail alternative funds.  A higher demand for retail alternative funds, in 
turn, precipitates more sustainable market-driven confluence of the mutual 
and hedge fund industries.189 
The mandatory investment adviser registration provisions under the 
Dodd-Frank Act incentivize investment advisers to set up retail alternative 
funds.  Prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, the registration of a 
hedge fund was a significant disincentive for investment managers to enter 
into the mutual fund sector.  Investment advisers to hedge funds disfavored 
registration with the SEC because they considered the associated disclosures 
intrusive and feared negative effects on profitability.  By eliminating 
previous registration exemptions and requiring investment advisers with 
AUM of more than $150 million to register with the SEC,
 
the Dodd-Frank 
Act mandates SEC registration and reporting of information that was hitherto 
considered proprietary and private.190  Hedge fund advisers who are required 
to register with the SEC have incentives to also manage mutual funds or set 
up retail alternative funds because the regulatory burden is minimally higher 
in comparison with preregistration legal requirements.191  Some registered 
hedge fund advisers may choose to offer hedge fund strategies in a mutual 
fund setting, thus increasing the trend towards confluence. 
Mutual and private investment fund confluence contributes to the 
gradual erosion of the public/private distinction in federal securities 
regulation.  Beyond the retail investor-protection concerns associated with 
UMFs, the growth in the number of UMFs calls into question the continuing 
relevance of the public/private divide in federal securities regulation.192  The 
academic literature on this topic
 
has explored a number of different subjects 
and suggested a continuous blurring of the traditional boundary lines 
between regulated companies and activities on the one hand, and “private” 
firms and transactions on the other hand,
 
including blurring that follows the 
enactment of new legislation (for instance, the JOBS Act and the 
Crowdfunding Act).  The confluence of mutual funds and private funds is an 
important example of the blurring of the public / private distinction in federal 
securities regulation.193 
Finally, the proliferation of unconstrained mutual funds calls into 
question the effectiveness of retail investor protections under the Investment 
Companies Act of 1940.  The author’s analysis reveals, among other things, 
that UMFs share several important investment strategy and risk attributes 
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with private funds.  These include broad authority to trade almost any type 
of security, including illiquid securities; take concentrated investment risks 
in individual securities, sectors, or markets; make extensive use of 
derivatives; engage in short selling; and change the duration of the portfolio 
without any effective limit.194  However, unlike private funds, which are 
generally limited to investors who satisfy particular investment 
sophistication and net worth requirements, shares of UMFs may be 
purchased by retail investors, including those with quite limited or even no 
investment experience. 
V. BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY APPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATE 
INVESTMENT FUNDS 
Starting in 2015, private investment fund managers have begun to 
embrace the use of blockchain technology to facilitate investment and 
process optimization.195  Several private investment funds have spearheaded 
the implementation of blockchain technology and smart contracting in their 
business model and continue to expand it.  While some funds simply focus 
on trading bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies to avoid market fluctuations, 
others invest in and/or acquire companies that use blockchain technology to 
provide synergies to their other portfolio companies.  Yet others go much 
further by fully automating a hedge fund secured by blockchain technology.  
This is accomplished by improving the administrative procedures of private 
equity deal making or using cryptocurrencies as incentives for data 
scientists’ competitive models that facilitate investment analysis 
efficiencies. 
Several key benefits are associated with the introduction of blockchain 
technology in private investment funds’ back-office administrative processes 
and compliance.  By automatically recording all transactions in a given 
private investment fund along with any documentation or information that is 
associated with a given transaction, blockchain technology reduces the 
otherwise significant costs associated with human oversight in recording, 
organizing, and maintain investment fund data and records.  Blockchain 
technology also creates a verified marketplace and provides market 
participants with reliable and fully transparent data on market transactions.  
The technology reduces the need for information exchange among parties 
because all transactions are fully recorded and transparent.  Blockchain 
increases security because transactions are recorded in an immutable 
 
 194.  Id. at 9.  
 195.  Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Innovation for Private Investment Funds (U. of St. 
Thomas Minn., Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 17-21, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998033 
[https://perma.cc/MX47-AA6S], at 3. 
KAAL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/2018  3:22 PM 
620 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 20.3 
 
database that ensures the validity of data and removes expensive security 
procedures and labor-intensive data maintenance while reducing the need for 
a paper trail.  Overall, the technology allows for a significant simplification 
of transactions and enormous increases in efficiency and speed of private 
investment fund transactions while providing significant security 
improvements. 
Diversification is a key element of blockchain-based change in the 
private investment fund industry.  A benefit of investing in digital currencies 
rather than traditional investments is that digital currencies can be immune 
to the vicissitudes of traditional stock investments and the equity markets.  
Although crypto investments can be just as, or more, volatile than traditional 
investments, digital currencies might be used to hedge against traditional 
investments. 
The use of blockchain technology increases the competitive pressure in 
the private investment fund industry.  Private investment funds 
implementing blockchain technology are facilitating and spearheading 
radical changes in financial markets.  First and foremost, the structural 
characteristic of blockchain as a decentralized model for financial 
transactions disintermediates and disrupts the existing financial 
infrastructure.  Private investment funds that are first movers in the 
implementation of the blockchain infrastructure systems in finance directly 
contribute to that disintermediation and facilitate the accelerating evolution 
of the blockchain infrastructure in finance. 
The competitive pressure in the private investment fund industry 
increases through operational and business efficiencies gained by those 
funds that implement the technology.  Most large fund advisers in the private 
equity and hedge fund industry have not yet considered implementing 
blockchain technology in combination with big data applications and 
artificial intelligence.  This, however, may change in the foreseeable future 
if and when larger managers realize that their smaller competitors who utilize 
these technologies gain substantial operational efficiencies and cost savings 
and are able to substantially diversify their portfolio holdings via such 
technologies.  The threshold for change for bigger managers may be dictated 
by the implementation cost of such new technologies.  If and when the long-
term benefits of using the technologies exceed the implementation cost, 
which are much larger for larger managers than for the smaller managers 
who are currently experimenting with such technologies, larger managers are 
incentivized to start the innovation process as well. 
The increasing use of blockchain technology in combination with 
artificial intelligence and big data contributes to the market pressure on the 
fee structure of private investment funds.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
the majority of private fund advisers that use blockchain technology, 
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artificial intelligence, and big data in different aspects of their operations or 
strategy have a substantially lower fee structure than those who do not use 
them.  While the overall proportion of strategies of private investment funds 
that apply modern technologies, including blockchain technology, is still 
small, as the use of blockchain technology grows in the private investment 
fund industry, the pressure on the fee structure is likely to continue to grow. 
Blockchain technology enables managers to charge per-transaction fees 
which undermines the existing 2/20 fee model.  Blockchain technology 
facilitates a seamless and efficient calculation of management fees per 
transaction.  In contrast to the traditional settlement and calculation of fees 
in a per-transaction model that created a prohibitive amount of work making 
such operations very difficult to execute, blockchain technology overcomes 
all of these restrictions.  It enables the fully automated allocation of the 
appropriate fee to the correct executed trade and associated client account 
without any manual reconciliation or settlement.  While not all blockchain-
enabled private investment funds charge per-transaction fees, the majority of 
private fund advisers that use blockchain technology, artificial intelligence, 
and big data in different aspects of their operations or strategy charge their 
investors lower fees. 
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
This Article examined the author’s scholarly contributions and 
empirical findings pertaining to private investment fund regulation from 
1998 to 2016, tracing the main regulatory developments in each phase since 
1998.  Starting with a discussion of and the implications of LTCM and 
associated regulatory changes since 1998, the author’s scholarly 
contributions in phase one focused on evaluating the proposed remedies for 
private fund investment regulation and suggesting alternatives.  Evaluating 
the effects of regulatory changes in the aftermath of the Dodd-Frank Act, the 
author’s scholarship in phase two summarized the regulatory evolution of 
the private fund industry and focused particularly on the evaluation of the 
effects of the Dodd-Frank Act on the private investment fund industry.  
Scholarship in phase two also analyzed the shifting evaluation of the possible 
systemic risk posed by the private fund industry and pertinent developments 
in private investment fund investor due diligence.  The author’s scholarship 
in phase three evaluated the implications of the emerging evidence of 
confluence of prior separate asset classes in the aftermath of the Dodd-Frank 
Act and other long-term implications of the regulatory overhaul under the 
Dodd-Frank-Act, such as the dilution of the public/private distinction in 
federal securities regulation. 
Future scholarship on private investment fund regulation will likely 
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continue the existing work in the context of the effects of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, and it will further the examination of evidence on confluence of the 
hitherto separate asset classes (mutual funds and private funds).  In 
particular, comparative empirical scholarship on the different impact of the 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive in Europe and Title IV of 
the Dodd-Frank Act could help clarify how and when private investment 
fund managers who invest internationally and use foreign branches are 
regulated and what impact such regulation across borders has on the industry.  
In the confluence context, future scholarship will help ascertain the impact 
of private and mutual fund confluence.  Other areas of future scholarship 
may include the evolution and impact of private fund investor due diligence 
requirements. 
The rise of blockchain technology and the prominent applications of 
blockchain technology in the private investment fund industry serve as 
prominent examples of the impending seismic shifts in the private 
investment fund industry.  Blockchain initiatives have significant 
implications for innovation in the private investment fund industry.  As the 
industry continues to evolve in the blockchain realm, more change is 
inevitable.  Legacy infrastructure upgrades via blockchain technology may 
only be a first step towards crypto integration and evolution via the private 
investment fund industry. 
 
